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CONFLICT OF LAWS-TORTS-CHOICE OF LAW IN MULTIPLE STATE DEFAMATION-Plaintiff, a Connecticut corporation engaged in business throughout several Eastern states, brought an action for an injunction and damages
arising from alleged defamatory statements broadcast over defendant's radio
network. Defendant's broadcast originated in New York and was heard by
listeners from Maine to North Carolina and as far west as Pennsylvania including the area in which plaintiff was carrying on its business. Defendant
moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief could
be granted. To rule on this motion, it was necessary to choose the appropriate
governing law. Held, the law of New York, the state of the forum, should be
applied. Dale System v. General Teleradio, (D.C. N.Y. 1952) 105 F. Supp. 745.
The question of choice of law in multiple state torts has received scant recognition in judicial opinion largely because of the theoretical and practical difficulties which must be overcome in reaching a rational solution.1 In the principal case, the federal court was obligated to apply the conflict of laws doctrine
of the state in which it was sitting.2 New York courts have followed the Restatement choice of law rule for torts generally and accordingly have selected
the law of the state where "the last event necessary to make the actor liable"
took place. 8 It has been suggested that in cases of defamation this is the place

l In several cases the courts have either ignored the conflict of laws problem [Layne
v. Kirby, 208 Cal. 694, 284 P. 441 (1930); Curley v. Curtis Publishing Co., (D.C. Mass.
1942) 48 F. Supp. 29] or recognized the problem without resolving it. Grant v. Reader's
Digest Assn., (2d Cir. 1945) 151 F. (2d) 733, cert. den. 326 U.S. 797, 66 S.Ct. 492
(1946); Spane} v. Pegler, (7th Cir. 1947) 160 F. (2d) 619.
2 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 61 S.Ct. 1020 (1941).
3 CONFLICT OP LAWS R:.asTATEMENT §377 (1934). Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224
N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918); Fitzpatrick v. International Ry. Co., 252 N.Y. 127, 169
N.E. 112 (1929).
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of communication.4 However, this test was not helpful in the principal case
since New York decisions had not authoritatively indicated which state is the
place of communication when multiple state defamation is involved.5 It is
submitted that there are two basic approaches which can be taken in selecting
the governing law in an action of this nature. As one alternative, the court
could have taken the realistic view that the libel was communicated in every
state in which it was heard by a third person to the injury of the plaintiff. The
consequence of this rule is to create at least one cause of action under the laws
of each of these states.6 By application of the traditional vested rights theory7 in
the conllict of laws field, the court would then be called upon to decide each separate cause of action under the law of the state in which it arose. While this
method of attack might be desirable from a theoretical standpoint, it runs
into insurmountable difficulties of practical administration. 8 Not only would
the court have the burden of acquainting itself with the different libel laws
of many jurisdictions, but the confusion resulting from the jury's attempt to
apply these different laws to the same facts and plaintiff's difficulty in proportioning his injuries among several states would be certain to impede prompt
justice.9 The other alternative, and the one followed by this court, presents a
workable solution to this problem. For conllict of laws purposes, the cause of
action in multiple state defamation is considered to arise in only one jurisdiction.
The objection to this assumption is that it is completely incompatible with the
vested rights theory because, of necessity, it fails to recognize and enforce
CONFLICT OP LAWS RESTATEMENT §377(5) (1934).
5The court cited Mattox v. News Syndicate Co., (2d Cir. 1949) 176 F. (2d) 897, as
leaving this question explicitly undecided because the plaintiff had suffered damage in only
a single state. However, the language used in that case suggests that libel is communicated
wherever it is heard by a third person to the detriment of the plaintiff. Does this indicate
that the court might not confine the place of communication to a single state?
6 Under the traditional approach a separate cause of action was created every time libel
was transmitted to another person. Because this rule became unmanageable when there
was a wide circulation of the libel, such as in a newspaper or radio broadcast, most jurisdictions have now adopted a single publication rule under which all of the libel arising
within the state is treated as one cause of action. See IO LA.. L. Rav. 339 at 340 (1950).
But regardless of the rule followed in the state where the cause of action arises, the single
publication rule is generally thought to be procedural and thus the law of the forum would
be applied. But compare Hartman v. Time, Inc., (3d Cir. 1948) 166 F. (2d) 127, in
which the forum's single publication rule was only applied to causes of action arising in
states which had a similar rule. This decision has been severely criticized by legal writers.
43 ILL. L. Rav. 556 (1948); 61 HARv. L. Rav. 1460 (1948); 48 CoL. L. Rav. 932
(1948).
7 "The theory of the foreign suit is that although the act complained of was subject
to no law having force in the forum, it gave rise to an obligation • . . which • . . follows
the person, and may be enforced wherever the person may be found. But as the only source
of this obligation is the law of the place of the act, it follows that the law determines not
merely the existence of the obligation, but equally determines its extent." Holmes, J., in
Slater v. Mexican National R.R. Co., 194 U.S. 120 at 126, 24 S.Ct. 581 (1904). GooDmca, CoNFLICT OP LAws, 3d ed., §92 (1949).
s Hartman v. Time, Inc., supra note 6, exemplifies the difficulty that can arise from
rhis approach even before the merits of the case are decided.
9This is discussed in 35 VA. L. Rav. 627 at 637-640 (1949)
4
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each cause of action arising under the law of each separate jurisdiction. It is
noteworthy that this court entirely ignored any inconsistency with this generally accepted doctrine.. Perhaps this can be explained by the fact that this
court has followed the local law theory rather than the vested rights theory in
deciding cases according to the laws of a foreign jurisdiction.10 Under this
local law doctrine, the court would not recognize any cause of action arising
in a foreign state but would only give cognizance to an obligation arising under
its own legal standards which in tum are determined by the extent to which
the forum will adopt the law of another place. While this application of the
local law theory appears to be a satisfactory means of avoiding the vested rights
objection, there still remains the problem of selecting the p~oper governing law.
This court suggested five contact points, namely, the state of the forum, the
place of the last event necessary to make the actor liable, the point of origination,
the state of principal circulation, and the domicile of the plaintiff, as possible
factors having an influence on the choice of law.11 A grouping of these dominant contacts indicated that three of them applied to New York exclusively
and that the remaining two were as favorable to New York as to any other
jurisdiction with the result that New York law was chosen. It is submitted
that the first requisite should be that the plaintiff sustained substantial injury
in the state whose law is to be applied. 12 This would give maximum effect to
the Restatement rule applicable to torts generally. With this requirement
satisfied, the court could then look to other dominant contacts which may be
pertinent to the facts of the particular case. While the court made no attempt
to lay down a mechanical test to be followed in every multiple state defamation
action in the future, this decision, nevertheless, has several significant aspects.
First, this decision shows a willingness by the court to recognize a problem
that had previously been ignored or avoided due to its difficulty. This would
seem to be true at least in jurisdictions following the local law approach under
which both a theoretical and workable solution could be reached. Secondly,
this is an indication that the court may choose a law other than that of the

10 Judge Learned Hand, the author and leading exponent of the local law theory, was
formerly a judge of this court. In Guinness v. Miller, (D.C. N.Y. 1923) 291 F. 768 at
770, Judge Hand said, " •.• However, no court can enforce any law but that of its own
sovereign, and, when a suitor comes to a jurisdiction foreign to the place of the tort, he can
only invoke an obligation recognized by that sovereign. A foreign sovereign under civilized
law imposes an obligation of its own as nearly homologous as possible to that arising in the
place where the tort occurs.''
11 For an evaluation of these contacts see Ludwig, "'Peace of Mind' in 48 Pieces v.
Uniform Right of Privacy,'' 32 MINN. L. REv. 734 at 760-762 (1948); 60 HARv. L. REv.
941 at 943-951 (1947).
12 While the court, in the principal case, appears to have discarded the Restatement
rule as being of no help in making the choice of law, it, nevertheless, resorted to this rule
in determining one of the contacts and it eventually chose the law of a state in which the
plaintiff actually did receive substantial injury. It is significant that the courts have very
seldom deviated from the Restatement rule in selecting the appropriate law to govern a tort
action. But see Gordon v. Parker, (D.C. Mass. 1949) 83 F. Supp. 40.
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forum in this type of case.13 This would be an incentive to lawyers who wish
to advocate the application of a foreign law which is more favorable to their
clients. Thirdly, this decision suggests several dominant contacts that the
court may consider material in selecting the governing law for multiple state
defamation and thereby notifies lawyers along what lines to direct their
arguments.
Peter Van Domelen, S.Ed.

13 Or did the court merely apply a test that would give the desired result of using
the forum's own law? The writer suggests that this has been the practice in a surprisingly
large number of conffict of laws cases.

